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Abstract  
 
We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the 
theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in 
market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one 
driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU 
countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant 
speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt 
crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in country 
specific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, 
competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at 
the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent months have seen the transformation of the global financial crisis into a 
sovereign debt crisis in the euro-area. Starting from Greece in autumn 2009, the euro-area 
crisis has since caused Greece to withdraw from international bonds markets and has put 
intense pressure on the bonds of other EMU countries, most notably Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. The intensity of the crisis has prompted European policy makers to take extraordinary 
measures aiming to limit its fall-out on the real sector of the affected countries and prevent its 
further spreading. These measures, ratified in May 2009, include an unprecedented in size 
(110 billion euros) three-year EU/IMF-financed emergency rescue package for Greece; and 
the creation of a European stabilisation mechanism ring-fencing 750 billion euros for 
countries that may find themselves in a position similar to the Greek one within the following 
three years. These measures, however, have so far not proved enough to ease the crisis, 
causing debates ranging from the optimum short-run response to the crisis to the eurozone’s 
overall long-term sustainability.  
With so much political and economic capital at stake, it is not surprising that the 
economics literature has responded actively to the eurozone crisis through a series of 
empirical studies. The consensus emerging from this literature, reviewed in section 2, is 
summarised in two main findings. First, both the amount and the price of the perceived global 
risk associated with investments in sovereign bonds, relative to the safe havens of US and 
Germany, have increased during the global economic downturn. This explains the across-the-
board increase in EMU spread values. In this process, the transfer of banking sector risk to 
sovereign borrowers, through bank bail-outs, has been central. Second, intra-EMU 
differences in spreads’ increases are explained by heterogeneous transfer of banking sector 
risk to sovereign borrowers and the pricing of heterogeneous macro-fundamentals. The 
penalties imposed by markets are further exacerbated by the interaction of macro-
fundamentals with the common international risk factor.  
The existing studies have shed much-needed light on the factors driving increasing 
EMU spreads, greatly enhancing our understanding of the eurozone crisis. Important 
questions, however, still remain unanswered. First, almost all existing studies are purely 
empirical. However informative, without a theoretical mapping to the events it aims to 
analyse no study can offer a full set of explanations and traceable future policy implications. 
Second, existing studies have not explained the events characterising the most recent and 
intense phase of the crisis. Why did the Greek spread escalate from 140 basis points in early 
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November 2009 to 250 points by the end of the year and nearly 600 in late March 2009? 
Third, why has the Greek spread been taking so much higher values compared to other 
periphery countries? Is the Greek macro-outlook so much worse than Portugal’s to justify 
spread values two or three times as high? Fourth, has contagion really taken place? Despite 
this widely held belief, no study has so far tested the hypothesis of contagion explicitly. 
Finally, what has been the role, if any, of speculative trading in the market for credit default 
swaps (CDS) on EMU government bonds? Such speculation has been suggested as one of the 
potential culprits behind the present turmoil with subsequent proposals ranging from tighter 
regulation of the CDS market to an outright permanent ban on naked CDS trading. Are such 
proposals justified or is the role of CDS speculation overestimated in the ongoing debate?    
This paper aims to make a contribution to the study of the EMU sovereign debt crisis 
by addressing each of the five questions raised above. It is the first paper to pursue an 
empirical analysis of the crisis based on a theoretical model, namely the one by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). The main premise in the latter’s analysis is that the EMU debt crisis can be 
seen as a currency crisis in disguise. This is caused by systemic risk which in the absence of 
currency markets is diverted into the markets for sovereign bonds. Based on this insight, they 
build a model of the eurozone debt crisis combining elements from the second- and third-
generation currency crises models respectively proposed by Obstfeld (1996) and Krugman 
(1998). Their model offers an explanation for all the events characterising the EMU debt 
crisis, including the sudden escalation of the Greek debt crisis in November 2009. It also 
offers testable hypotheses relating to the full set of questions posed above. Our empirical 
analysis puts these hypotheses directly into the test. We use monthly data covering the period 
January 1999 – February 2010, as well as a range of specification and estimation techniques 
(time series and panel-based). Our main findings can be summarised as follows:  
First, during the period preceding the global credit crunch (January 1999 – July 2007), 
with the possible exception of expected fiscal deficits, markets priced neither macro-
fundamentals nor the very low at the time international risk factor. This finding is consistent 
with the ‘convergence-trading’ hypothesis, according to which markets were discounting 
only the optimistic scenario of full real convergence of all EMU economies to the German 
one. This pricing behaviour has changed decidedly during the crisis period (August 2007 – 
February 2009), with markets now pricing both the international risk factor and individual 
macro-fundamentals on a country-by-country basis.  
Second, we obtain evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the Greek debt crisis is 
due to a background of deteriorating macro-fundamentals and a double shift in private 
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expectations: Starting from November 2009, Greece was transferred from a regime of fully-
credible commitment to future EMU participation under the perception of fully guaranteed 
(by other EMU countries) fiscal liabilities, to a regime of non-fully credible EMU 
commitment without fiscal guarantees. This regime-shift not only explains the sudden 
escalation of the Greek debt crisis but also the difference in spread values observed between 
Greece and other periphery EMU countries with not too dissimilar macroeconomic outlook: 
Compared to Ireland, Portugal and Spain, markets perceive a much higher probability of a 
Greek voluntary exit from the EMU, and/or a Greek default. In short, Greece’s problems are 
as much about trust as they are about economics.  
Third, we confirm that the overwhelming majority of EMU countries have 
experienced contagion from Greece, most prominently Portugal, Ireland and Spain. This is 
interpreted as evidence that the Greek bond yield has now become a proxy for EMU-specific 
systemic risk, increasing borrowing costs in other EMU countries beyond the level justified 
by the common international risk factor and their idiosyncratic fundamentals. In short, the 
Greek problem has become an EMU-wide problem.  
Finally, we do not find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that speculation in the 
CDS market, including the Greek one, is a major force driving the eurozone debt crisis. This 
does not imply that CDS speculation is not taking place or it does not drive EMU spreads at 
higher data frequencies. What it implies is that in the longer-term perspective captured by our 
monthly data frequency, EMU spreads are mainly driven by accumulated intra-EMU 
macroeconomic imbalances and international risk conditions. Although the latter may 
improve as global economic activity gradually picks-up, the former is unlikely do so without 
significant intra-EMU economic/institutional reforms outlined in the concluding section. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the post-1999 determinants of EMU government bonds. Section 3 discusses the theoretical 
framework by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) on which our empirical analysis is based. 
Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical findings. Finally, 
section 6 summarises and offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Related literature  
Existing studies on EMU government bond yields and their spreads against Germany 
can be classified in two broad categories, respectively covering the period prior to and 
following the onset of the global financial crisis in August 2007.  Both groups typically 
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follow the approach of the general literature conditioning yields/spreads on three variables 
(see e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009):
1
 First, a common international risk factor, 
capturing international risk appetite. The latter captures both the level of perceived risk and 
its unit price thought to be higher during periods of financial stress. The common risk factor 
is typically measured using indexes of US stock volatility or the spread between the yields of 
various categories of US corporate bonds against US treasury bills. Second, credit risk, 
capturing the probability of partial or total default on behalf of a sovereign borrower. This is 
typically measured using indicators of past or projected fiscal performance.
2
 Third, liquidity 
risk. This refers to the size and depth of the sovereign bonds market and captures the risk of 
capital losses in the event of early liquidation or significant price changes resulting from a 
small number of transactions. Liquidity is a variable acknowledged to be particularly difficult 
to measure, with bid-ask spreads, volumes of transaction and the level of or the share of a 
country’s debt in total EMU sovereign debt used as proxies. Furthermore, the literature 
acknowledges a high degree of co-linearity between empirical measures of liquidity and the 
global risk factor.  
Studies on EMU government bonds covering the period prior to the global financial 
crisis are not unanimous regarding the role of each of the three determinants discussed above. 
However, the prevailing view can be summarised as follows: First, the international risk 
factor was important in determining spreads against Germany (see Codogno et al. (2003), 
Geyer et al. (2004), Longstaff et al. (2007), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Favero et al. (2010)). This effect was particularly 
strong during periods of tightening international financial conditions (see Haugh et al., (2009) 
and Barrios et al., (2009)) as well as for countries with high levels of public debt (see 
Codogno et al., (2003)). Second, credit risk was priced, as suggested by Faini (2006), Bernoth 
et al. (2004), Bernoth and Wolff (2008), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et 
al. (2009).
3
 These findings are interpreted by Bernoth and Wolff (2008) and Schuknecht et al. 
(2009) as evidence that the Stability and Growth Pact was a credible mechanism imposing 
fiscal discipline among EMU members. This view, however, is not uncontested: Manganelli 
                                                 
1
 See, among others, Alesina et al. (1992) for OECD countries; Bayoumi et al.(1995) for US states;  Booth et al. 
(2007) for Canadian provinces; and Laubach (2009) for the US federal government.  
2
 Credit risk includes three types of risk: default risk, capturing the probability of default on coupon payments 
or/and repayment of the principal on maturity date; credit-spread risk, capturing the risk that the market value of 
a sovereign bond will underperform the value of bonds of comparable quality; and downgrade risk, reflecting 
the probability of capital losses due to a bond’s downgrade by leading rating agencies (see Barrios et al., 2009).  
3
 By contrast, Codogno et al. (2003) find that markets penalised fiscal imbalances only in two EMU countries 
(Italy and Spain). Furthermore, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) find that fiscal conditions affected EMU sovereign 
bond yields but this effect had became weaker following the euro’s introduction.  
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and Wolswijk (2009) raise the question as to whether the penalties imposed by markets were 
sufficiently high to encourage EMU governments to change unsustainable fiscal policies. 
Finally, the role of liquidity risk is controversial. Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004), 
Pagano and Von Thadden (2004), and Jankowitsch et al. (2006) find a limited or declining 
liquidity effect on EMU spreads. By contrast, Gomez-Puig (2006), Beber et al. (2009), and 
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) argue in favour of a more prominent effect, particularly 
during periods of tightening financial conditions and higher interest rates.
4
  
Moving to the literature covering the crisis period, consensus emerges on two points. 
First the observed widening in EMU spreads is mainly driven by the increased global risk 
factor. In this process, the role of domestic banking sectors is crucial, with the financial 
system transforming global risk into sovereign risk through two channels (see Gerlach et al., 
2010): First, in periods of financial distress the government might be obliged to recapitalise 
banks using public money, thus increasing its fiscal liabilities. Second, shortages in banking 
liquidity restrict credit to the private sector causing economic recession increasing fiscal 
imbalances further. With national banking sectors having different degrees of exposure to 
global financial conditions the increase in the common global risk factor causes a 
heterogeneous impact on national spreads.
5
 Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), 
Mody (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Gerlach et al. (2010) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) have 
all established the importance of the global risk factor during the crisis period and its impact 
on the latter through the financial sector.  
The second point of consensus is that during the crisis markets have been penalising 
fiscal and other macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. excessive current accounts) much more 
heavily than they used to prior to the crisis. Furthermore, markets not only attach a higher 
weigh on fiscal imbalances, but they may also price their interaction with the common 
international risk factor (see Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh et al el. (2009), Manganelli and 
Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2010)). Increased focus on heterogeneous fiscal 
                                                 
4
 Favero et al. (2010), on the other hand, provide theoretical justification and empirical evidence according to 
which during the early EMU-years liquidity had a smaller effect on sovereign spreads in periods of high risk. 
This is intuitively explained by the fact that in crisis periods investors choose from a reduced set of alterative 
investment opportunities, limiting their willingness to move away from sovereign bonds.  
5
 Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) emphasise the role of monetary policy during the crisis, captured by shifts in 
the main refinancing operations rate of the ECB. They argue that interest rates affect spreads through two 
channels. First, low interest rates increase funding liquidity and provide incentives to financial managers to take 
risks to increase expected returns on their investments. Second, interest rates affect a country’s fiscal outlook 
through their effect on the state of the business cycle. They acknowledge, however, that interest rates are 
strongly correlated with risk aversion, in which case the interpretation of their empirical findings is similar to 
the studies quoted above.  
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outlooks and the non-linearities caused by the aforementioned interaction is another major 
factor explaining the differential spread increases observed among EMU countries. On the 
other hand, on balance, the evidence suggests that although the role of country-specific 
liquidity risk is non-negligible, it is rather limited (see Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh et al. (2009), and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009)).
6
 
The studies quoted above have shed much-needed light on the factors driving spreads 
during the eurozone crisis, thus enhancing significantly our understanding of the latter. 
Important questions, however, remain unanswered. First, existing studies do not capture the 
most recent and intense phase of the eurozone crisis (November 2009 onwards). Second, they 
are purely empirical. But without reference to a theoretical model of the eurozone crisis, no 
study can provide a full set of explanation of events, and perhaps more importantly, a set of 
traceable future policy implications. Our study fills this void by anchoring its empirical 
analysis to the theoretical treatment of the eurozone crisis provided by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). We proceed to review this model immediately below.  
 
3.  Theoretical background  
The basic premise in the analysis by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) is that the 
eurozone debt crisis can be seen as a currency crisis in disguise: It is caused by 
systemic/macroeconomic risk which in the presence of national currencies would have 
resulted into currency upheaval, while in their absence is diverted to the markets for 
sovereign bonds. Based on this insight, they develop a model of rational EMU exit combining 
elements from the second- and third-generation currency crisis models, by Obstfeld (1996) 
and Krugman (1998) respectively. They treat EMU participation as commitment to a system 
of fixed exchange rates and, following Obstfeld (1996), assume one control variable for the 
government, namely the decision to stay in or exit the euro. The government decides 
rationally its optimal course of action by balancing the costs of the two options. The cost of 
exiting the euro is assumed to be constant, given by C. The cost of staying in the EMU is a 
positive quadratic function of the deviation of the exchange rate at which the country has 
joined the euro, denoted by s , from the  PPP-consistent exchange rate, denoted by s*. This 
deviation is captured by the value of the real exchange rate q = (s* – s ), a variable 
                                                 
6
 Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find a stronger effect for liquidity risk, which they interpret as evidence of 
incomplete integration among national EMU sovereign bond markets. Based on this finding, they argue in 
favour of a higher degree of urgency in completing the ongoing process of intra-EMU financial integration. 
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summarising the effect of all macroeconomic shocks (internal and external) hitting the 
domestic economy. Overvaluation relative to the PPP-consistent equilibrium is costly, as it 
reduces external competitiveness leading to lower output, increased unemployment, higher 
external and public debt and higher interest payments to domestic and foreign creditors.  
The government’s optimal choice is endogenous to the status of the expectations of 
the private sector, which has two rather one, control variables. As in Obstfeld (1996), the 
private sector determines the credibility of the government’s commitment to EMU 
participation (credible versus non-credible commitment). Second, and in a way similar to the 
assumptions of Krugman’s (1998) model, the private sector determines whether the 
government’s fiscal liabilities are perceived as guaranteed or not guaranteed by the rest of the 
EMU members. The above give rise to three possible regimes for private expectations. In the 
first regime markets perceive the country’s EMU participation as fully credible and 
outstanding fiscal liabilities fully guaranteed. In that case, the loss of staying in the euro is 
given by L1: 
 
L1 = [γ1 (s* – s )]
2
    γ1≥ 0                 (1)  
 
 By allowing γ1 to take a zero value, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas account for the 
possibility that the interest rate on government bonds, capturing the cost of continued EMU 
participation, is de-linked from the present state of macro-fundamentals, in the same way 
assets’ prices are de-linked from their expected returns in Krugman’s (1998) model through 
government guarantees to the liabilities of financial institutions under lax financial 
supervision.
7
 The intuition underlying γ1 =0  is that with future EMU participation regarded 
as fully credible, markets fully expect the government to take all necessary action to correct 
any macro-imbalances;
8
 and while it does so the risk of capital losses due to government 
default is zero, as a result of the perceived fiscal guarantees. Equation (1) also allows for 
another mechanism of macroeconomic correction, also consistent with fully credible EMU 
participation: By allowing γ1 to take values greater than zero, the model captures the possible 
existence of a market-discipline mechanism, where the private sector sends signals to the 
                                                 
7
 In Krugman’s (1998) model the perception of government guarantees transforms projects financed by financial 
institutions from fair bets to “heads-you-win-tails you-do-not-lose” bets. Under conditions of high international 
liquidity, investors switch their pricing model from one based on expected outcomes to one based on best-case 
outcomes. This results into bubbles in assets’ prices, rendering them vulnerable to sudden, abrupt drops when 
market expectations shift back to non-guaranteed financial liabilities status.  
8
 This is analogous to the smooth-pasting effect predicted by target-zone models of the exchange rate under 
conditions of full market credibility for the target zone.  
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government, through the imposition of higher cost of servicing public debt, that 
macroeconomic correction is necessary, maintaining at the same time absolute certainty that 
the government will respond to this signal by taking all necessary corrective action.  
In the second regime markets continue to regard fiscal liabilities to be guaranteed as 
long the country remains in the EMU, but do not regard commitment to EMU participation as 
fully-credible. Rather, they perceive a non-zero probability that the government will choose 
to exit the EMU on its own, to avoid the welfare cost of macroeconomic correction necessary 
for long-term participation in the single currency.
9
 Assuming real overvaluation, the interest 
rate on government bonds now incorporates an exchange rate risk premium. In comparison to 
L1 the same value of real exchange rate q = (s* – s ) results into a higher loss value, giving 
rise to the loss function described by (2) below: 
 
L2 = [(γ1 +γ2) (s* – s )]
2
    γ1, γ2> 0                (2) 
 
Finally, in the third expectations’ regime markets regard commitment to the EMU as 
non-fully credible and do not perceive government liabilities to be guaranteed.
10
 In that case, 
the interest rate on government bonds incorporates not only an exchange rate premium but 
also a default premium. For every level of overvaluation the cost of continued EMU 
participation increases even further and is now given by:  
 
L3 = [(γ1 + γ2 +γ3 ) (s* – s )]
2
    γ1, γ2, γ3> 0                (3) 
 
 Under all expectations’ regimes the government chooses to stay in the EMU as long 
as the cost of continued EMU participation is lower than the cost of euro exit. For every 
expectations regime Arghyrou and Tsoukalas derive critical thresholds of overvaluation 
above which the government finds it optimal to leave the EMU. The value of these thresholds 
declines with negative shifts in expectations reducing the range of successful defence of 
EMU participation as presented diagrammatically in Figure 1. Like Obstfeld (1996) the 
                                                 
9
 The possibility that markets perceive a positive probability of eventual EMU failure resulting into a re-
introduction of exchange rate risk had been considered since the early years of the eurozone’s existence (see e.g.  
Geyer et al., 2004).  The model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) implies that during the EMU sovereign debt 
crisis this probability, and the premium associated with it, have increased significantly.  
10
 There is a fourth regime, where the private sector views future EMU participation as credible without fiscal 
guarantees of government bonds from EMU partners. In this case however the country’s commitment to EMU 
participation implies a strong incentive for sound fiscal finances. Therefore, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) 
treat this case as isomorphic to the first regime, i.e. credible EMU participation and guaranteed fiscal liabilities. 
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model predicts that shifts in expectations can result in self-fulfilling prophesies of EMU exit. 
However, the availability of two control variables for the private sector gives rise to two 
rather than one zone of multiple equilibria: The government might find it optimal to leave the 
EMU not only following an adverse shift of expectations regarding future EMU participation 
but also following a shift in perceptions regarding the availability of fiscal guarantees.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 The analysis quoted above provides a number of testable hypotheses for explaining 
the movements of spreads of EMU government bonds against Germany since the euro’s 
launch in 1999. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas interpret the near-zero spread values observed 
between January 1999 to July 2007 as evidence of expectations of fully credible EMU 
commitment under the perception of fiscal guarantees. This resulted in de-linking macro-
fundamentals from interest rates on government bonds, i.e. EMU governments operated 
under L1 with γ1 = 0 or γ1 taking values very close to zero.  During that period the increasingly 
deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals of periphery EMU countries (see section 4 
below) were not penalised with higher interest rates on government bonds, as markets, 
endowed with ample global liquidity, continued to discount full real convergence of 
periphery EMU economies to the core ones.
11
 Arghyrou and Tsoukalas propose that 
following the onset of the global credit crunch in August 2007 and the resulting significant 
capital losses sustained on corporate portfolios, markets started pricing sovereign bonds on a 
country-by-country basis based on macroeconomic performance. Initially, they continued to 
regard all countries’ participation to the EMU as fully credible, still pricing bonds under L1 
but now setting γ1 > 0. This explains the differences in spreads observed since August 2007, 
reflecting different degrees of real exchange rate overvaluation. The subsequent sudden 
escalation of the Greek debt crisis is attributed to a double shift in expectations, from a 
regime of fully credible EMU commitment under guaranteed fiscal liabilities, first to a 
regime of non-credible EMU commitment in November 2009, caused by Greece’s reluctance 
to commit to necessary corrective macroeconomic action; and then to a regime of non-
credible EMU commitment and non-guaranteed fiscal liabilities in January 2010, caused by 
intra-EMU disagreements regarding the necessity and extent of a Greek a bail-out.
12
 This 
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 See Adalid and Detken (2007) and Belke et al. (2010), among others, for empirical analyses that identify a 
link between global liquidity and financial asset prices. 
12
 In May 2010 Greece was eventually given a bail-out rescue loan package of 110 billion euros, financed by the 
EU, the ECB and the IMF. Later that month the EU announced a European stabilisation mechanism, making 
available a total of up to approximately 750 billion euros to EMU countries funder market pressure over the next 
three years. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) argue that EMU spreads failed to respond to these measures,
 11
double expectations’ shift moved Greece from L1 to L3, explaining the sudden, pronounced 
increase in Greek spreads without any significant news on Greek fundamentals.
13
 By 
applying to all EMU members, the withdrawal of the perceived fiscal guarantee spread the 
Greek debt crisis to other EMU periphery countries, which have also sustained significant 
competitiveness losses over the period 1999-2007.  
If the model summarized above were be correct, an econometric investigation of the 
movements of EMU spreads over the period 1999-2010 should produce the following 
findings: First, prior to the credit crunch crisis, i.e. during January 1999-July 2007, the real 
exchange rate should not be statistically significant in explaining spreads’ movements. 
Second, following the onset of the global credit crunch crisis in July 2007, the real exchange 
rate should be significant in explaining spread movements, i.e. real appreciation should cause 
higher spread values. Finally, and to capture the assumed contagion effect, during the crisis 
period the Greek spread should be significant in explaining spreads in other EMU countries, 
even when real appreciation and the effect of the global risk aversion has been accounted for. 
All the above constitute testable hypotheses, which we address immediately below.  
 
4.  Data description 
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the monthly 10-year government 
bond yield spread relative to Germany for ten euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We exclude Luxembourg, 
where the outstanding government debt and the associated market are very small, as well as 
the countries that joined the euro since 2008 (Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). The 
yield spreads sample covers the period 1999.01-2010.04. The data sources for bond yields are 
Bloomberg (1999.01-2000.12) and the European Central Bank (2001.01-2010.04).
14
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
                                                                                                                                                        
they were taken too late and were not enough to reverse the adverse shift in expectations caused by the original 
handling of the crisis.  
13
 On 13 October 2009 Greece announced a revision of its projected 2009 public deficit from 6% of GDP to 
13.7% of GDP. However, the Greek spread did not react to this news, as markets seem to have fully anticipated 
the substantial worsening of the Greek fiscal position well before it was announced. The Greek spread started its 
steep ascend in mid-November 2009, following the submission by Greek authorities of the Greek proposed 2010 
public budget to the European Commission. The exceedingly cautious approach, in terms of promoting long 
overdue fiscal reform, adopted by the proposed 2010 budget resulted into public critical, comments on behalf of 
top EU officials (including the president of the ECB). Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) argue that this event 
validated market fears that Greece was not determined to address its long-standing structural problems 
necessary for long-term EMU participation. As such, this was the event that operated as the catalyst for the shift 
in market expectations from credible to non-credible EMU participation.  
14
 The ECB interest rate data is available at:  http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html. 
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[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Figure 2 plots the 10-year euro-area government bond yield spreads. Four important 
stylised facts should be noted. First, before the credit crisis (1999-mid 2007) spreads against 
Germany had stabilised at very low levels despite deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals 
in many countries.
15
 As Table 1 shows, during the pre-crisis period, the average spread 
ranged from 8.4 basis points in France to 53.5 basis points in Greece, with most countries 
exhibiting spreads of less than 20 basis points. Figure 3 plots the (log) real effective exchange 
rate of the euro-area economies and shows that the real exchange rate appreciation that 
commenced in 2001 persists after 2004 in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain reflecting 
lower international competitiveness.
16
 On the other hand, in Germany the trend from 2004 
onwards is relatively flat. This divergence in external competitiveness within the euro-area is 
also reflected in Figure 4 which plots the current account balance as percentage of GDP. The 
data in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands is characterised by an overall positive trend, 
indicating the current account is improving over time. However, in the rest of the euro-area 
countries the current account is generally deteriorating over time. The deterioration has been 
particularly pronounced in Greece, Portugal and Spain where the current account deficit takes 
increasingly high values throughout the entire sample period, signifying the presence of 
important internal imbalances within the euro-area.
17
  
 [FIGURE 3 HERE] 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Second, during the credit crisis all euro-area economies experienced a large increase 
in their spread versus Germany. As Table 1 indicates, since August 2007, average spreads 
increased by a factor of around three or four, on average, in most countries and by a factor of 
ten in Ireland. German government bonds operated as a ‘flight-to-quality’ asset during the 
crisis putting an upward pressure in all euro-area government bond yield spreads. This 
‘flight-to-quality’ feature of German bonds is apparent in Figure 5, which plots the 10-year 
German yield together with a general indicator of common international risk, the Chicago 
                                                 
15
 The onset of the crisis is generally accepted to be late July 2007. On 9 August 2007, the European Central 
Bank made the first large emergency loan to banks in response to increasing pressures in the interbank market. 
16
 Between January 2001 and February 2010, the real effective exchange rate appreciated by 22, 18, 15 and 10 
percent in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, respectively. Becker (2009, p.4) stresses that developments in a 
country’s external competitiveness “can be summarized in one single number: the real effective (i.e. trade-
weighted) exchange rate”.  
17
 The real effective exchange rate, current account balance and GDP series were obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics dataset. The real effective exchange rate is defined so that an 
increase describes a real appreciation.   
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Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX). This is a measure of US implied 
stock market volatility obtained via Bloomberg.
18
 Towards the end of 2008, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the credit crisis reached its peak. During that period of market 
turmoil, the VIX increased sharply, while the 10-year German government bond yield moved 
in the opposite direction indicating that in an environment of heightened uncertainty, 
investors flock to the perceived safety of German bonds.  
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Figures 6 and 7 depict the transformation of the credit crisis into a sovereign debt 
crisis with euro-area government budget balances deteriorating sharply and government debt 
as a proportion of GDP increasing significantly since mid-2008.
19
 The fiscal deterioration 
reflects lower tax revenues for the euro-area governments, due to economic contraction, as 
well the fiscal stimulus packages that were implemented to prevent further contraction. 
Furthermore, governments faced the additional major fiscal cost of having to support the 
financial sector, via significant capital injections in the euro-area banks’ balance sheets, 
guarantees, such as the Irish government bank guarantee scheme (29/09/2008), and outright 
purchases of assets from banks. 
20
 
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
[FIGURE 7 HERE] 
Third, despite reductions in the second half of 2008, no country has returned to its 
pre-crisis spread level. Finally, and very importantly, there is initial evidence of contagion 
from the Greek debt crisis to other EMU members. In particular, the average spread in 
Greece increased significantly since September 2009, at 257.4 basis points, marking the 
Greek debt crisis. During the latter part of the sample, average spreads increased also in the 
other Club-Med countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) as well as in Ireland, indicating the 
                                                 
18
 The VIX is constructed using call- and put-implied volatilities from the S&P 500 index 30-day options. 
Implied volatility measures are forward-looking, as opposed to historical volatility measures which are 
backward-looking. An index value of e.g. 20 for the VIX indicates that the implied volatility of 30-day options 
on the S&P 500 is 20 percent.  Note that prior to 22 September 2003, the S&P 100 index was used for the 
calculation of the VIX. Monthly averages of the VIX are calculated from daily observations. Econometric 
analysis using regime-switching models in IMF (2003) suggests that ‘flight-to-quality’ periods and high levels 
of the VIX tend to coincide. 
19
 The general government lending/borrowing and gross government debt series were obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics dataset.   
20
 Sgherri and Zoli (2009) argue that the discretionary euro-area fiscal stimulus is estimated to around 1.1 and 
0.9 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. They also point out that the immediate euro-area fiscal cost 
of the banks’ support measures is, on average, around 3.5 percent of (2008) GDP. 
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possibility of contagion from Greece. This conjecture is explicitly tested by our econometric 
analysis below.  
In our benchmark pre-crisis econometric specification, spreads are modelled on their 
lagged level, the log of the real effective exchange rate and the VIX. This specification maps 
directly our empirical analysis to the theoretical model presented in section 3, also controlling 
for the effects of momentum trading and international risk aversion. The VIX, often called 
the ‘investor fear gauge’ since it tends to spike during market turmoil periods (Whaley, 
2000), is a reasonable proxy for global financial instability (Mody, 2009). Other studies that 
employ the VIX as an aggregate risk proxy in analyses of euro-area government bond yield 
spreads include Beber et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010). 
21
 Furthermore, we estimate 
alternative, extended specifications where the set of explanatory variables for spreads also 
includes a measure of bond market liquidity, industrial production growth, the expected fiscal 
position, and lagged Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads. All aforementioned variables are 
calculated as differentials versus Germany. 
 Bond market liquidity is measured by the size of government bond market as in 
Bernoth et al. (2004), Gomez-Puig (2006), Haugh et al. (2009) and Attinasi et al. (2009) 
among others. In particular, we use the ratio of a country’s outstanding general government 
debt to euro-area-wide total.
22
 As Table 2 shows, Italy, Germany and France have the largest 
government bond markets in the euro-area, while the three smallest markets are those of 
Ireland, Finland and Portugal. We use the annual growth rate of industrial production as a 
proxy for the state of business cycle. 
23
 As Alesina et al. (1992) point out, sovereign debt 
becomes riskier during periods of economic slowdown (see also Bernoth et al., 2004). Table 
2 indicates that prior to the crisis Ireland exhibited the highest growth rate while Portugal 
underperformed exhibiting negative average growth. During the crisis, industrial production 
declined in all euro-area members, with Spain and Italy being particularly affected.  
                                                 
21
 We also experimented with various US corporate spreads measures of risk in our econometric modelling of 
spreads. See Codogno et al. (2003), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2009, 2010), 
among others, for euro-area government yield spreads studies that proxy aggregate risk using US corporate 
spreads. Our results, available upon request, suggest that the VIX dominates corporate spreads as an indicator of 
global risk in yield spreads regressions. Furthermore, we experimented with a measure of European implied 
stock market volatility, that is, the VSTOXX. This volatility index is calculated using implied option prices 
written on the DJ Euro STOXX 50 index. Using the VSTOXX in our empirical analysis, we obtain quite similar 
results (see also Beber et al., 2009), which are available upon request.     
22
 The data on outstanding amounts of general government long-term securities other than shares is obtained 
from the ECB’s Securities Issues Statistics:  http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=17102. 
23
 The industrial production series were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics dataset.   
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Moving on to frequently used measures of credit risk, we obtained data on the 
expected fiscal position of the euro-area economies from the European Commission’s 
Economic Forecasts Database. 
24
 The expected fiscal position provides a proxy for credit 
quality, with an expected fiscal deterioration implying higher risk. We use the one-year-ahead 
expected balance, that is, net lending or borrowing (as percentage of the GDP) and the one-
year-ahead expected gross debt of the general government (as percentage of the GDP). The 
utilisation of expected, as opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with a number of recent 
studies including Attinasi et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010). The 
descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that only during the last months of the crisis 
subsample period expectations appear to shift sharply towards fiscal deterioration. For 
example, in Greece, the latest figures from the European Commission’s Economic Forecasts 
(Spring 2010) indicate that debt is expected to rise to almost 134% of the GDP by 2011, 
signifying an enormous fiscal strain. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Finally, we obtained data from Bloomberg on the CDS spreads for the euro-area 10-
year government bonds. The CDS is a credit derivative which allows the buyer to purchase 
insurance against the risk of default.
25
 The CDS market for developed country sovereign debt 
is relatively new but has experienced significant growth over the last years.
26
 Nevertheless, 
according to the BIS (2010), the amount of sovereign risk which is reallocated through CDS 
markets is not as large as the gross outstanding volumes would imply since net CDS positions 
as proportion of the outstanding sovereign debt are only close to 5% in Portugal and even less 
                                                 
24
 These forecasts are produced by the DG ECFIN twice a year (spring and autumn). They result from analyses 
made by the DG ECFIN’s country-desks, as opposed to a centralised econometric model. The data is available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm. As Attinasi et al. 
(2009) point out, given the prominent role of the European Commission’s forecasts, investors may use them a 
source of information to form their expectations. 
25
 The buyer of a CDS contract on sovereign bonds agrees to make regular payments (CDS premium) to the 
seller in return for a payment by the seller if the credit event (default of the reference entity) occurs. The CDS 
spread is equal to the total amount that the buyer pays per year divided by the total face value of the bonds 
(notional principal). The payment that the buyer receives if the credit event occurs is equal to the notional 
principal multiplied by: (1- recovery rate); where the recovery rate is equal to the ratio of the post-default value 
of the bond to its face value. For example, the recovery rate for CDS contracts with Lehman Brothers as the 
reference entity was only about 8% (see Hull, 2009, Chapter 23).  
26
 10-year CDS data for Greek, French, Italian and Spanish contracts commence on 01/12/2003 in Bloomberg. 
However, German data commences on 15/03/2004 and hence this is the earliest starting point for the calculation 
of CDS spreads relative to Germany. Data for Austria, Belgium, Finland and Portugal commence on 
05/04/2004, while in Ireland and Netherlands the CDS contracts become available towards the end of the sample 
period, on 29/01/2009 and 23/01/2008, respectively. 
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in Greece, Ireland and Spain.
27
 CDS spreads have been used by Barrios et al. (2009) and 
Beber et al. (2009) as a proxy for credit risk in high-frequency empirical investigations of 
eurozone spreads (weekly and intraday, respectively), where expected fiscal position 
measures are not available. Figure 8 plots the 10-year government bond yield spreads 
together with the corresponding CDS spreads. It appears that in most euro-area economies the 
two series tend to broadly co-move over time, especially during the credit/debt crisis. Sharp 
increases in CDS spreads are observed in Greece, Portugal and Spain since autumn 2009, 
with the cost of insuring against default reaching a historical high by the end of April 2010.  
[FIGURE 8 HERE] 
 
5.   Empirical framework and results  
 This section presents our estimated econometric models and empirical results. 
Subsection 5.1 contains the findings from the pre-crisis period (1999.01-2007.07), subsection 
5.2 refers to the crisis period (2007.08-2010.04). Subsection 5.3 focuses on the Greek debt 
crisis; and subsection 5.4 on the effects of trading in CDS markets on EMU spreads.  
  
5.1 Modelling spreads during the pre-crisis period 
 The baseline model for spreads prior to the crisis relates them to country-specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals, captured by the value of the real exchange rate, and the 
international risk factor, accounting at the same time for persistence in the data. The model is 
given by Eq. (4) below: 
 
1 1 2 3t t t t tspread a spread q vix uβ β β−= + + + +       (4) 
 
where spreadt denotes the 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany, qt is 
the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate, vixt denotes the logarithm of the CBOE 
Volatility Index and ut is a white noise error term.  
 Table 3 - A presents the time-series estimates of the baseline model correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the residuals (OLS-HAC; see 
                                                 
27
 The BIS (2010) suggests that sovereign reallocated risk is better captured by net CDS positions since a large 
proportion of trades reflect offsetting transactions as CDS market participants frequently do not terminate or 
replace the former contracts. This feature of the CDS market generates a chain of linked exposures with market 
participants having limited information about the parties beyond their direct counterparties (see ECB, 2009). 
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Newey and West, 1987). Spreads are quite persistent as indicated by the estimates of the 
autoregressive parameter (β1) which range from 0.74 in Netherlands to 0.96 in Austria and 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level in all cases. Beyond autoregressive 
dynamics however, spreads either do not react or exhibit the wrong sign in their reaction to 
the international and country-specific explanatory variables. Specifically, the VIX is not 
significant at the 5% level of significance as determinant of spreads in any country, thereby 
suggesting that the link between spreads and global financial risk was not active during the 
pre-crisis period. Furthermore, there is evidence of non-pricing, as well as mispricing in 
certain instances, of the country-specific macroeconomic fundamental since the real effective 
exchange rate coefficient is either statistically insignificant or negative and significant. This 
indicates that during the pre-crisis period real exchange rate appreciation and the associated 
loss of competitiveness were not penalised by bond market participants in the form of higher 
spreads. This finding is robust to controlling for contemporaneous correlation in the error 
terms across the equations reflecting, for example, common aggregate shocks. 
28
  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Table 3 - B reports the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of the parameters of the 
baseline model augmented by the proxy for bond market liquidity (liqt). In all cases, the 
coefficient of liqt is not significantly different from zero, indicating that spreads were not 
affected by bond market liquidity risk considerations during the pre-crisis period. Similar 
evidence, in terms of the limited explanatory power of country-specific factors as 
determinants of spreads, is provided by Table 3 - C. This table shows the results from 
regressions where, in addition to the bond market liquidity proxy, a proxy for the state of 
business cycle (output growth differentials, gindt) is included in the baseline model. At the 
5% level of significance, both additional variables are statistically insignificant. It is only 
when the expected fiscal position variables (expected net lending/borrowing differentials, 
deft; and expected gross debt differentials, debtt) are incorporated in the baseline model, that 
we obtain some evidence supporting the role of a country-specific factor with the 
                                                 
28
 The average cross-country correlation coefficient in the residuals of Eq. (4) is equal to 0.43. In order to 
empirically account for this correlation, we form a system of equations, representing the baseline model in each 
country, and estimate it with the seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR). SUR estimates of the system’s 
parameters account for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. The 
pre-crisis estimates are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. In line with the OLS-HAC time-series estimates in 
Table 3 - A, SUR estimates of the real exchange rate coefficient are either statistically insignificant or 
statistically significant with a negative sign. Using SUR, there is more evidence, as compared to the robust OLS 
estimates, of the degree of financial market volatility being a determinant of spreads, since the VIX coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant in some countries. See also Barrios et al. (2009) for evidence from weekly 
data supporting the view that the degree of risk aversion affected the euro-area government bond yield spreads 
during the pre-crisis period (2003-2009), while country-specific factors did not exert much influence. 
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theoretically expected sign. As we can see in Table 4 - D, deterioration in the fiscal position 
(higher expected net borrowing deft, describing a negative shift in net lending) leads to higher 
spreads in the majority of countries, with the coefficient of deft being negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% or less in eight cases. On the other hand, the evidence does 
not support the existence of a strong link between spreads and expected debt during the pre-
crisis period. Hence, the credit risk channel appears to mainly operate via the expected fiscal 
balance, as opposed to expected debt. 
 Table 4 reports panel estimates of the baseline model and its extensions: 
 
'
1 1 2 3it i it it t it itspread a spread q vix uβ β β−= + + + + +Θ X     (5) 
 
where 
'
1[ ... ]it it jitx x=X , and  
'
1[ ... ]jθ θ=Θ  denote the vector of additional 
explanatory variables and the relevant coefficient vector, respectively. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Eq. (5) represents a fixed-effects panel data model and is estimated using Generalised 
Least Squares (GLS)-based cross-section weights which account for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity.  The null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects is strongly rejected both 
for baseline and the three alternative models. The pre-crisis results from panel estimation of 
the baseline model (see column 2 in Table 4) are similar to those from time-series estimation 
as spreads are found to be quite persistent, the real effective exchange link remains either 
statistically insignificant or significant with the wrong (negative) sign, while global financial 
market volatility does not have any explanatory power over spreads. Similarly, panel 
estimation results of the extended models (see specifications 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4) are also in 
line with the previously presented time-series estimates since output growth and expected 
debt differentials are statistically insignificant, while the expected fiscal balance is a 
significant determinant of spreads. The main difference between pre-crisis time-series and 
panel estimates is that within the latter bond market liquidity conditions become statistically 
significant but not with the theoretically expected negative sign, thereby indicating 
mispricing of liquidity risk. 
29
 
 Thus, overall, the pre-crisis results can be viewed as being supportive of the 
‘convergence trade’ conjecture, according to which investors “…bought the bonds of 
                                                 
29
 A negative sign is theoretically expected since improvements in the liquidity of the market for government 
bonds should lead to lower spreads as the liquidity premium declines.  
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peripheral European governments in the hope that their yields would convergence with those 
of Germany” (The Economist, 12/06/2010). In terms of the theoretical model presented in 
section 3, these findings offer support to the hypothesis that prior to the global credit crunch, 
spreads were de-linked from macro-fundamentals, as markets discounted full convergence 
between core and periphery EMU countries, i.e. a state of the world with EMU countries 
operating under L1 with γ1= 0. The resulting high demand for the bonds of periphery countries 
exerted a downward pressure on their spreads and the expectation of convergence, which lay 
at the heart of this trading strategy, became self-fulfilling leading to profits for bond market 
investors and lower borrowing costs for the governments. It appears that markets were 
myopically discounting, in a way similar to the predictions of Krugman’s (1998) model  for 
asset prices, only the best-case scenario of full convergence to German fundamentals and 
failed to react to deteriorating domestic fundamentals as indicated by falling competitiveness. 
Consequently, ‘convergence trade’, along with the absence of an effective EU-sponsored 
mechanism of economic monitoring imposing reform, relaxed considerably the degree of 
pressure on many governments to improve fundamentals. This contributed to increasing real 
divergence within the eurozone and put in place the necessary background for the 
developments taking place during the crisis period.  
 
5.2 Modelling spreads during the crisis period 
 The Greek spread variable is added to the baseline model for the spreads of the other 
eurozone members during the turmoil period allowing us to explicitly test the hypothesis of 
euro-area contagion from the Greek debt crisis: 
 
GR
1 1 2 3 4t t t t t tspread a spread q vix spread vβ β β β−= + + + + +     (6) 
 
where spreadt
GR
 denotes the 10-year Greek government bond yield spread relative to 
Germany, vt is a white noise error term and all other variables are as previously defined.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Table 5 - A presents the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of Eq. (6). The crisis results 
are strikingly different in comparison to the pre-crisis results as international and country-
specific explanatory variables are now strongly significant in most cases. More specifically, 
first, the persistence of spreads is considerably lower during the crisis with the estimates of 
the autoregressive parameter ranging from 0.34 in Portugal to 0.75 in Ireland. Second, the 
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link between spreads and global financial risk becomes strongly active since August 2007, as 
indicated by the statistical significance of the VIX in all countries. The Italian spread exhibits 
the greatest degree of exposure to the global risk factor, followed by Austrian and Irish 
spreads. Third, the real exchange rate coefficient is positive and statistically significant in 
most countries. Hence, in contrast to the pre-crisis period, where there was either non-pricing 
or mispricing of the risk associated with competitiveness losses, during the crisis this 
country-specific macroeconomic risk is reflected in the spreads. Fourth, contagion from the 
Greek debt crisis appears to have taken place almost everywhere since the coefficient 
associated with the Greek spread variable is positive and significant in most countries. The 
degree of contagion is not uniform ranging from a low level of contagion in France to high 
levels in Portugal, Ireland and Spain. The high degree of exposure of Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain to the Greek debt crisis does not come as a surprise given that, like Greece, since the 
euro’s introduction in 1999 these countries have all experienced significant deterioration in 
their fundamentals.
30
 These findings are robust to accounting for contemporaneous 
correlation in the errors across equations.
31
  
 In Table 5 - B and C we report the results from augmenting the baseline model by the 
bond market liquidity and business cycle conditions proxies. In Table 5 - B, the estimated 
coefficient of the liquidity measure is negative and statistically significant in Austria, 
Belgium, Finland and Portugal, indicating that liquidity risk is priced in the spreads of these 
countries. In line with the pre-crisis results, however, output growth differentials are not 
successful in explaining spreads since the relevant coefficient is statistically significant only 
in Ireland and, furthermore, does not have the expected sign.
32
 The rest of our findings 
remain robust, as real exchange rates, the VIX and the Greek spread, remain significant in 
most countries’ when the additional explanatory variables enter the regressions.   
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
 Results from panel estimation of the baseline model (now excluding Greece) and its 
extensions are presented in Table 6. These are in line with the time-series evidence since real 
exchange rate appreciation, higher global financial volatility and increases in the Greek 
spread exert a positive and statistically significant effect on the spreads of other eurozone 
countries during the crisis period. Furthermore, the effect from output growth differentials is 
                                                 
30
 As Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010, p.18) point out, “These include competitiveness losses leading to 
substantial current account deficits, particularly in the cases of Portugal and Spain (see also Arghyrou and 
Chortareas, 2009); and…a major fiscal deterioration in 2008-2009”. 
31
 See SUR estimates of the baseline model during the crisis in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
32
 An increase in the growth rate of industrial production (relative to Germany) should lead to lower spreads, 
hence a negative sign is expected. 
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statistically insignificant, while the liquidity effect on spreads is negative and significant at 
the 5% level using the most general specification (see specification 4 in Table 6). Expected 
fiscal position variables were not included in the time-series regressions because, due to their 
bi-annual frequency, there is limited variability in the time-series dimension during the crisis 
period. Hence, this motivates the use of a panel regression to estimate their impact on spreads 
over the crisis. The panel estimation results indicate that, as in the pre-crisis period, increases 
in expected deficit lead to higher spreads.  
 Overall, our findings in this section suggest that significant shifts have taken place in 
the market for euro-area government bonds since August 2007.  The evidence suggests that 
the predictive power of country-specific fundamentals and international risk conditions over 
spreads varies over time and is activated during the crisis period. It appears that the 
credit/debt crisis put a halt on ‘convergence trade’ and bond market participants start to 
differentiate between countries on the basis of macroeconomic risk reflected in 
competitiveness losses as well as liquidity risk, thereby putting pressure on the bonds of 
uncompetitive and/or small issuers. In terms of the theoretical model presented in section 3, 
this is consistent with a state of the world where EMU governments (with the exception of 
Greece, whose case is examined below) may still operate under L1 but γ1 now takes a positive 
value. If this important change in the behaviour of investors persists over time then it will 
mark the ascent of a new era where losses of competitiveness are penalised by higher spreads. 
Such a development would be consistent with historic experience from the US states-debt 
market, where the New York City debt crisis in 1975 resulted into a permanent 
discrimination among USA states on the basis of the latter’s fiscal performance (see 
Schuknecht et al, 2010). A permanent increase in focus on national fiscal performance will 
increase the degree of market pressure on governments of less competitive eurozone 
members for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to boost competitiveness and 
promote real convergence. Contagion from the Greek debt crisis and the withdrawal of the 
implicit EMU/German fiscal guarantee further intensify the need for urgent reforms in the 
periphery EMU countries.   
 
5.3  The Greek debt crisis 
 We now turn our attention to Greece, the country which sparked the EMU sovereign 
debt crisis in autumn 2009 and has since been at the centre of focus of investors and 
policymakers. Table 7 shows the OLS-HAC time-series estimates of the baseline model and 
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its variants for Greece. When the models are estimated over the entire crisis period (see 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 7), the results are at first sight non-plausible since the VIX and the 
real effective exchange rate are not strongly significant, while the bond market liquidity 
measure does not have the expected negative sign. Adding the business cycle proxy, and 
removing the insignificant liquidity proxy from the model of Greek spreads leads to an 
improved specification with all the explanatory variables being statistically significant at the 
5% level, or less (see columns 3 and 4 in Table 7). The coefficient of output growth 
differentials is negative indicating that Greek spreads react positively to a slowdown in 
growth. This finding reveals the existence a business cycle-related risk premium which 
reflects bond market investors’ worries regarding the ability of the Greek government to 
continue repaying its public debt and promote crucial structural reforms within an 
environment of economic contraction.
33
 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
As argued above, the lack of significance for the variables capturing international risk 
aversion and external competitiveness, VIX and real exchange rate respectively, in the 
benchmark specifications (columns 1 and 2) reported in Table 7 seem implausible given 
Greece’s central position in the crisis. These findings are likely to be the result of 
econometric misspecification due to the omission of variables capturing the regime-switch 
occurring in November 2009, as suggested by the theoretical model by Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2010). Hence, we re-estimated the Greek specifications over the sub-period 
August 2007 to October 2009, thereby excluding the last months in our sample which were 
characterised by extreme volatility in Greek spreads. Specifically, the most intense phase of 
the Greek debt crisis commenced on November 2009, with the spread on Greek 10 year 
government bonds increasing from around 135 basis points in mid-November 2009 to 693 
basis points on 28 April 2010.  Excluding this extremely volatile period, the Greek results 
over the crisis period are consistent with those of the other eurozone members since both the 
country-specific external competitiveness fundamental and the global risk factor are priced 
by bond markets (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 7). We further investigated the possibility of 
structural change by incorporating a slope dummy variable in the full crisis-period regression 
                                                 
33
 According to the latest forecasts, the contraction of the Greek economy, which commenced in 2009 with a 2% 
annual decline in real GDP, will continue in the immediate future. The spring 2010 European Commission 
forecast indicates that the Greek economy will contract by 3% during 2010 and by 0.5% during 2011, while 
according to the IMF (April 2010 forecast) the corresponding figures are 2% (2010) and 1% (2011). Contrary to 
Greece, Germany and most of the eurozone countries are expected to return to growth in 2010. 
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model, which allows for a shift in the real exchange rate coefficient since November 2009.
34
 
The results provide evidence in favour of a regime-switch in the relationship between spreads 
and the real exchange rate within the crisis-period with the estimated coefficient of the latter 
increasing since November 2009 (see columns 7 and 8 in Table 7). This suggests that Greek 
spreads have become more exposed to external competitiveness losses.
35
  
Our finding are consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model by Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas (2010), according to which Greece has not only experienced a switch in 
γ1 from zero to positive values under L1, but also experienced a shift from L1 to L2 in 
November 2009 and possibly to L3 in early 2010. Another element differentiating Greece 
from other periphery EMU members is that Greece is the only country for which markets 
may price the state of the business cycle, a finding confirmed by the equations modelling 
Greek CDS spreads reported below. This is consistent with the view that markets assign a 
further premium in Greek bonds, reflecting doubts regarding the ability of Greek authorities 
to push through the reforms necessary to achieve the required macro-adjustment within an 
environment of deepening economic recession. This finding, combined with the one 
regarding a Greek-specific negative shift in market expectations, suggest that the Greek debt 
crisis is as much a problem of trust as it is one of economics.  
 
5.4  The effects of trading in the market for Credit Default Swaps  
 Finally, we examine the link between government bond yield spreads and CDS 
spreads. Visual inspection of the data in the previous section revealed that both bond and 
CDS spreads widened during the crisis. According to a hypothesis that has been extensively 
discussed over the last months, speculators operating through the CDS market are to be 
blamed for the rise in Greek as well as Spanish and Portuguese spreads since the autumn of 
2009. The potentially detrimental effects of trading in the CDS market in terms of reinforcing 
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 The dummy variable (D2009.11) is equal to 1 from November 2009 onwards and 0 otherwise. Note that the 
theoretical model in section 3 predicts a further shift in expectations, in January/February 2010. However, with 
our estimation sample covering the period 2007.08-2010.02, it is not possible to capture this second regime shift 
using a second dummy variable, as this turns out to be perfectly collinear with the first one.  
35
 We have tested the statistical significance of the slope dummy variable on the coefficient of the real exchange 
rate term for all EMU countries. Unlike Greece, where this dummy was found significant with a positive sign, 
for the remaining EMU countries we obtained a small but statistically significant negative coefficient. The only 
exception was Ireland, for which the dummy was insignificant. These findings (available upon request), confirm 
that the negative shift in expectations discussed above is specific to Greece. The negative sign found for other 
countries is consistent with a substitution effect, according to which less risk-averse investors, still interested in 
higher returns reallocate their portfolios from the unacceptably high macroeconomic risk of Greek bonds to the 
more acceptable risk of other EMU countries. However, the very small values found for the coefficient of this 
slope dummy, as well as the observed movements in spreads, suggest that this reallocation effect is too small to 
moderate the contagion effects reported in Tables 5 and 6.  
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the Greek debt crisis and spreading it to other EMU countries have recently received 
significant attention (see ECB, 2009), while the speculation hypothesis has received strong 
support from euro-area political leaders.
36
 According to the latter, buyers of sovereign CDS 
contracts raise the cost of insurance against sovereign default leading to rises in the 
underlying government bond yield spreads. This increases debt interest costs making default 
more probable. Consequently, CDS spreads widen further thereby generating a new episode 
in the vicious cycle of rising insurance and borrowing costs.
37
  
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 At the heart of the speculation hypothesis, as typically expressed, lays the assumption 
of a positive relationship between spreads in the market for government bonds and past 
values of spreads in the CDS market, with increases in CDS spreads leading to higher 
sovereign spreads. In order to examine whether this conjecture is validated by the data, we 
augmented the baseline crisis model of bond yield spreads by lagged CDS spreads. Table 8 
shows the estimation results. In the majority of countries, including Portugal and Spain, 
lagged CDS spreads cannot explain bond yield spreads, when macroeconomic risk and 
international risk factor are accounted for. Hence, interpreted in the context of the speculation 
hypothesis, our evidence does not support the idea that the recent increases in Portuguese and 
Spanish borrowing costs can be attributed to speculation via the Portuguese and Spanish 
CDS, respectively through a direct channel. Nevertheless, given that the finding of Greek 
contagion remains statistically significant in all countries, if speculation is responsible for the 
rise in Greek spreads then it may also indirectly affect the spreads of other eurozone countries 
through the indirect channel of contagion.   
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 The Greek results in Table 9 show that during the crisis the coefficient associated with 
the past CDS spread is positive and statistically significant in the bond yield spread 
regressions. Furthermore, the relationship between the Greek government bond yield spread 
and the real effective exchange rate becomes statistically insignificant when controlling for 
developments in the CDS market. In contrast, the effect of global financial risk and output 
growth differentials remains significant. Hence, on the face of it, speculating activity may 
                                                 
36
 For example, on 6 May 2010 the German Chancellor suggested that “in some ways it’s a battle of the 
politicians against the markets…The speculators are our adversaries”. 
37
 In response to worries about speculation, on 18 May 2010 the German government announced a one-year ban 
on the purchase of Euro-area sovereign CDS by investors who do not own the underlying bonds (‘naked’ CDS), 
while proposals for tighter regulation of the CDS market are currently being discussed by European 
policymakers. The German government measures also include a temporary ban on the ‘naked’ short-selling of 
Euro-area government bonds and shares of ten major German financial institutions.  
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have increased Greek spreads along with exposure to country-specific macroeconomic risk 
and global financial risk. We argue, though, that the speculation hypothesis in its standard 
form is incomplete since establishing a positive link between CDS and bond yield spreads is 
not sufficient, on its own, to support the claim that speculative trading can explain spreads. 
The reason is that being an insurance contract, a CDS can be used both for 
speculation/arbitrage purposes and hedging purposes. Therefore, the Greek sovereign CDS 
market itself may well be driven by risk-averse buyers hedging their exposure to credit risk, 
generated by their holdings of Greek sovereign debt. In addition, even in the case of non-
ownership of Greek sovereign debt, a ‘naked’ CDS may be bought as an instrument of proxy-
hedging, i.e. purchasing insurance for sovereign risk in order to hedge exposure to the Greek 
banking-sector risk.
38
 Thus, hedging, as well as speculation, activity may also be able 
explain, to a certain extent, the surge in the price of CDS contracts and, by extension, Greek 
sovereign bonds spreads.  
   [TABLE 10 HERE] 
 There would be sufficient evidence to support the claim that the Greek debt crisis is 
exclusively the result of speculative trading if and only if Greek CDS spreads themselves do 
not reflect any country-specific or international risk factors and simply react positively to past 
increases in their level. This would indicate that momentum-driven, non-fundamentals based, 
speculation is taking place with investors purchasing CDS attracted by their past price 
performance and without considering the underlying macro-fundamentals. To test this 
hypothesis, we repeat the previously discussed estimations modelling the Greek government 
bond yield spread with the dependent variable now being the Greek CDS spread. The 
estimation results from empirical specifications that model the Greek CDS spread on its past 
value, domestic fundamentals and the global risk factor are reported in Table 10. They 
indicate that Greek CDS spreads during the crisis period reflect global financial instability as 
well as business cycle risk and external competitiveness considerations (see columns 1, 2 and 
3 in Table 10). Furthermore, as in the Greek bond yield spread regressions, the November 
2009 regime shift in expectations is supported by the statistical significance of the slope 
dummy variable associated with the real exchange rate. Note also that unlike columns (7) and 
(8), where the inclusion of the dummy rendered industrial production growth marginally 
                                                 
38
 Becker (2009) argues that since financial CDS were already relatively expensive prior to the credit crisis 
peaking in the autumn of 2008 investors may have attempted to proxy-hedge banking exposure using sovereign 
CDS. This process transformed banking sector risk into sovereign risk and led to higher sovereign CDS spreads. 
Attinasi et al. (2009), IMF (2009) and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) relate the bank-to-sovereign risk transformation 
to the announcement of support measures for banks in the autumn of 2008. See also Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
for evidence of a strong link between banking crises and sovereign default using long historical data. 
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insignificant, this remains significant at the 5% level even after the inclusion of the slope 
dummy (see column 4 in Table 10). Greek CDS spreads are quite persistent but can be 
explained by macroeconomic fundamentals and global risk indicating the lack of significant 
speculation effects in the Greek CDS, and by extension, sovereign bond market. 
 Overall, our empirical findings suggest that during the crisis period, both the Greek 
government bond yield spread and the Greek CDS spread are strongly linked to macro-
fundamentals and international risk aversion. From that point of view, the role of any 
speculative trading appears to be limited and not the original driving force behind the 
widening of Greek spreads in both markets. This does not imply that speculative trading is 
not taking place in the Greek and other CDS markets during the crisis period. This may well 
be the case, with the effects of speculation probably being more prominent in frequencies 
higher than the monthly data used in our analysis. What our findings imply is that such 
speculation trading, if it exists, is not irrational but initiated by the post-1999 marked 
deterioration of the Greek and other periphery EMU countries macro-fundamentals to 
unsustainable levels. From that point of view, and as predicted by Obstfeld’s (1996) model, 
speculative trading is part of the mechanism through which the economy moves from an 
unsustainable path to a more sustainable equilibrium. Whether the new equilibrium will be 
reached through a marked improvement in the macro-fundamentals of periphery EMU 
countries or a major reshaping of the EMU remains to be seen. 
 
6.   Summary and concluding remarks   
This paper offered a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Compared to existing studies our paper is the first to base its empirical analysis on a 
theoretical model of the eurozone crisis, namely the one by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). 
We use data of monthly frequency, as well as time series and panel estimation techniques, to 
model the spreads of 10-year EMU government bonds against Germany during the pre- and 
post-crisis periods, respectively covering January 1999 – July 2007 and August 2007 – 
February 2010. We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings which can be 
summarised as follows: First, during the pre-crisis period, with the possible exception of 
expected fiscal deficits, markets did not price macro-fundamentals and international risk 
conditions. Second, during the crisis period, markets have been pricing both factors on a 
country-by-country basis. Third, and in relation to the country at the epicentre of the EMU 
debt crisis, Greece, our findings support the hypothesis by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) 
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explaining the escalation of the Greek debt crisis in November 2009 as the result of an 
unfavourable country-specific shift in market expectations, increasing further the penalty 
already imposed by markets due to the country’s deteriorating macroeconomic performance. 
Fourth, the overwhelming majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from 
Greece, most prominently Portugal, Ireland and Spain.  Finally, we do not find evidence in 
favour of significant speculation effects on EMU spreads, neither through a direct nor an 
indirect, contagion channel.  
Our findings support the ‘convergence trade’ hypothesis for the pre-crisis period, 
according to which markets were discounting only the best-case scenario of full convergence 
to German fundamentals, even for countries displaying a clear deterioration of their macro-
fundamentals. This can be explained as the result of three factors: First, conditions of amble 
global liquidity and low risk over the best part of the past decade; second, expectations that 
accession to the euro would result in growth-inducing reforms in periphery EMU economies; 
and third lack of a mechanism establishing credibility for the “no-bail out” clause of the 
Maastricht Treaty. With the benefit of hindsight, it can now be argued that markets were 
operating under a perceived implicit guarantee according to which there was very little 
default risk associated with investment in EMU sovereign bonds, rendering them a “heads-
you-win, tails-you-do-not-lose” bet. Combined with the absence of an effective EU-
sponsored mechanism of economic monitoring imposing reform this relaxed market pressure 
on EMU governments to improve fundamentals, which in turn resulted into further real 
divergence within the eurozone. The increasing un-sustainability of this divergence was 
bound to result into a change in market behaviour. The trigger for the latter was the onset of 
the global credit crunch in 2007 which prompted markets to switch to a more rational bond 
pricing model largely based on idiosyncratic macro-fundamentals. If this important change in 
the behaviour of investors persists over time, as it did in the US following the New York debt 
crisis in 1975, then it will mark the ascent of a new era where markets will be imposing much 
higher penalties on macro-imbalances. As a result, although a gradual normalisation of the 
global economic outlook may narrow EMU spreads, as long as intra-EMU macro-imbalances 
persist spreads are likely to remain in high, by historical standards, levels.  
Our empirical findings lead to policy implications both at the national as well as the 
union level which are directly traceable to the theoretical model discussed in section 3. First, 
for EMU-periphery countries spreads to decline a marked improvement in fiscal position and 
external competitiveness appears necessary. Second, periphery EMU countries, and Greece in 
particular, must pursue a reversal of private expectations to a more favourable status than the 
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present one.
39
 In other words, governments must maintain, and in the case of Greece regain, 
the confidence of markets that they are fully committed to a permanent improvement in 
macro-fundamentals. Such a shift in expectations can only be achieved through the 
announcement of a credible and realistic reforms strategy, backed by unequivocal evidence of 
its determined implementation. In the absence of strong signals on behalf of periphery 
governments that they are determined to implement the necessary reforms, even in the face of 
significant short-term welfare losses, it is very likely that markets will continue to doubt the 
sustainability of these countries’ long-term participation in the EMU, and the risk that these 
expectations will become self-fulfilling will remain.  
At the union level, the crisis has highlighted the necessity of institutional reforms in 
two directions. First, to prevent a future crisis similar to the current one, the eurozone must 
develop effective mechanisms of fiscal supervision and policy co-ordination. Second, if a 
debt crisis does occur in an EMU country, it is important to prevent its escalation in the 
affected country and its contagion to other countries.
40
 This objective can be achieved 
through the creation of an EMU-run permanent mechanism of emergency financing, 
reassuring investors that there is no risk of default on EMU sovereign bonds. For such a 
mechanism to be successful in stabilising expectations, its rules and terms must be clear, 
transparent and known ex-ante. At the same time, the terms of emerging finance must be such 
as to eliminate the risk of moral hazard discouraging fiscal discipline and necessary reforms. 
Identifying rules achieving both objectives simultaneously is a challenging task calling for 
significant attention from academics and policy-makers alike.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
  The first policy recommendation corresponds to achieving values of q closer to the axes’ origin; while the 
second one implies starting from L2 or L3 to achieve a shift back to L1. Both developments imply a lower cost of 
continued EMU participation, i.e. a narrowing of spreads.  
40
 These recommendations are also traceable to the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). The 
first aims to prevent an increase in the value of q to levels resulting in a cost of staying in the eurozone beyond 
the critical threshold defined by C. The second aims to prevent changes in expectations moving countries from 
L1 to L2 or L3.  
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Figure 2: 10-year government bond yield spreads 
 
 
 
Note: Spreads are calculated versus Germany and are expressed in basis points. The shaded area 
corresponds to the period 2007.08-2009.08. 
 
 
Figure 3: Log real effective exchange rate  
 
 
 
Note: The real effective exchange rate is calculated using consumer price indices. An increase indicates a 
real appreciation.  
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Figure 4: Current account balance as percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: German 10-year government bond yield and VIX 
 
Note: The shaded area corresponds to the period 2007.08-2009.08. 
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Figure 6: General government net lending or borrowing as percentage of GDP 
 
 
Note: The shaded area corresponds to the period 2007.Q3-2009.Q4. 
 
 
Figure 7: Gross government debt as percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
Note: The shaded area corresponds to the period 2007.Q3-2009.Q4 
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Table 1: Average 10-year government bond yield spreads 
 
Note: Spreads are expressed in basis points. The full sample period is 1999.01-2010.04. The pre-crisis 
period is 1999.01-2007.07. The crisis period is 2007.08-2010.04. The crisis-contagion period is 2009.09-
2010.04. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Bond market size, industrial production growth and expected fiscal position 
 
Full sample 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
Crisis 
 
Crisis-contagion 
 
Note: All the data in Table 2 is expressed in percentages. The full sample period for the bond market size 
and expected fiscal position variables is 1999.01-2010.04, while for the industrial production growth the 
full sample period is 2000.01-2010.01. The pre-crisis period extends from the start of the sample until 
2007.07, while the crisis period extends from 2007.08 until the end of the sample. The crisis-contagion 
period extends from 2009.09 until the end of the sample.  
 
 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Full sample 22.3 25.4 17.8 13.8 76.4 36.4 39.4 13.8 34.1 23.6 
Pre-crisis 14.4 17.8 12.6 8.4 53.5 11.6 26.2 8.6 20.9 14.2 
Crisis 46.8 49.2 34.3 30.4 147.9 113.8 80.5 30.2 75.2 52.8 
Crisis-contagion 45.1 48.5 28.1 32.9 257.4 160.1 86.5 27.1 98.8 68.4 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.3 5.9 1.4 19.2 23.7 3.8 0.8 28.1 4.7 1.6 7.5 
Ind. Prod.  2.7 -0.1 0.9 -0.9 0.5 -0.2 4.4 -1.7 0.8 -1.6 -1.2 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -1.6 -0.9 2.5 -3.0 -2.3 -2.5 -1.1 -2.8 -1.1 -3.3 -1.0 
Exp. Debt 63.0 96.3 40.2 64.3 64.7 101.6 36.3 107.3 53.5 63.2 49.9 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.3 6.1 1.5 18.9 23.4 3.4 0.7 28.6 4.8 1.6 7.6 
Ind. Prod.  4.7 2.0 4.0 0.6 2.8 1.1 6.3 0.7 1.5 -0.3 1.6 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -1.2 -0.3 3.0 -2.4 -2.3 -1.8 1.0 -2.5 -0.9 -2.9 0.0 
Exp. Debt 62.7 98.4 41.1 61.5 63.5 101.5 31.6 106.9 54.0 60.3 50.5 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.2 5.2 1.0 20.3 24.3 5.1 1.0 26.4 4.2 1.8 7.4 
Ind. Prod.  -3.6 -6.4 -8.2 -5.7 -6.7 -4.3 -1.3 -9.0 -1.3 -5.4 -9.9 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -2.6 -2.8 1.0 -4.8 -2.2 -4.8 -7.4 -3.4 -1.9 -4.6 -4.1 
Exp. Debt 64.2 89.8 37.4 72.9 68.7 102.0 50.8 108.5 52.1 72.3 47.8 
 AUS BEL FIN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NEL POR SPA 
Bond Mkt Size 3.1 5.2 1.0 20.0 23.4 5.4 1.4 26.2 4.2 1.8 8.3 
Ind. Prod.  -6.2 -11.1 -15.1 -4.2 -8.6 -7.7 -4.0 -9.0 -1.3 -3.0 -7.0 
Exp. Budg. Bal. -5.4 -5.7 -4.1 -8.0 -5.1 -11.1 -14.5 -5.2 -6.0 -7.8 -9.9 
Exp. Debt 73.9 101.1 48.1 83.7 77.6 123.9 83.1 116.9 65.8 85.0 66.6 
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Table 6: Crisis panel estimates, fixed effects 
 
 
Note: Specification (1) corresponds to the baseline model during the crisis period. 
Specification (2) augments the baseline model by the liquidity measure. 
Specifications (3) and (4) further add output growth differentials and the expected 
fiscal position variables. The regression models (1) and (2) are estimated over the 
time period 2007.08-2010.02, while the end of the sample period is 2010.01 in (3) and 
(4). The panel members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Fixed effects panel estimates with GLS cross-
section weights in order to account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity are shown. 
Test for Fixed Effects (FE) shows the p-value for the null hypothesis of redundant 
fixed effects. The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
spreadit-1 0.73 *** 0.74 *** 0.74 *** 0.74 *** 
qit 0.76 ** 0.80 ** 0.92 ** 0.95 ** 
vixt 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 
liqit - -1.29 -1.30  -2.53 ** 
gindit - - 0.00 -0.004 
defit - - - -0.02 *** 
debtit - - - 0.00 
spreadt
GR
 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 
     
Test for FE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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